Raša Nedeljkov: “Serbian citizens are the victims of a deep, ongoing propaganda campaign”

RSF: Since RSF published its investigation on RT Balkan’s online broadcasting, the propaganda outlet RT (formerly Russia Today) announced its plan to launch a TV channel in Serbia and expand to Bosnia and Herzegovina, openly defying EU sanctions. What is your message to the leaders of EU member states and EU institutions who will meet on 18 December in Brussels with their counterparts from the Western Balkans?

Raša Nedeljkov (RN): Even amongst pro-democratic and pro-European citizens of Serbia, the perception of the EU is becoming more negative because of a strong sense that the EU does not care enough about the erosion of democracy in Serbia, and is turning a blind eye to President Aleksandar Vučić and even to growing repression against citizens and civil society, for the sake of its economic and geopolitical interests. Having that in mind, it is a delicate situation, in which criticising Serbian authorities only concerning RT while ignoring the burning ongoing issues — most of all, an increasing repression regarding protests that broke out across Serbia after “15 people were killed by corruption” in destruction of the parts of the Novi Sad railway station — wouldn’t be perceived well. Of course, no criticism at all would also be a sign of hypocrisy. 

Serbia can never be integrated into the EU if the only European partner in the process is the Serbian government. Treated with respect and understanding, citizens of Serbia also have to be a part of the process.  

RSF: Our recent investigation on Russian propaganda in Serbia drew significant reactions. For the first time in many years, Serbian pro-government media attacked RSF, and several government officials responded aggressively. President Vučić stated that, despite pressure, he aims to ensure all points of view are represented in Serbia’s media. What do these reactions reveal about the way Russian propaganda operates in Serbia?

RN: The first, positive takeaway is that there was a reaction at all. The context in which RSF’s investigation emerged is also significant. It came at a time when Serbia’s government is under scrutiny for failing to align its foreign policy with the European Union and for its true intentions regarding EU membership. This research also followed the Banjska incident in Kosovo [an armed assault carried out by Serb militants against the Kosovo Police in Northern Kosovo in September 2023], which severely damaged the Serbian government’s reputation regarding democratic principles. Additionally, the December 2023 elections featured drastic irregularities, particularly during the Belgrade elections. These events have negatively impacted Serbia’s international image in recent months. In response, Serbia has invested heavily in rebuilding its image, including establishing a public diplomacy office led by Arnaud Guillon [French-Serbian national who is the Director of the Office for Public and Cultural Diplomacy]. 

However, RSF’s report highlighted that there are virtually no checks and balances in Serbia regarding propaganda and the spread of disinformation. Serbian pro-government media have normalized the dissemination of false or misleading information to the point where it no longer surprises the public. There are no real consequences for such actions, and this normalization has reached a level where fabricated narratives are treated as credible alternatives to facts. This raises serious questions about Serbia’s direction. Are we building a European future for the country, or are we perpetuating a culture of ad hominem attacks against journalists and critical voices under the guise of pluralism?

RSF: In response to RSF’s investigation, a government narrative surfaced, promoting Serbia as a country of freedom of expression and a platform for diverse viewpoints. Is this framing new in Serbia, particularly in relation to Russian propaganda?

RN: This narrative first appeared when RT Balkans launched [in November 2022], claiming to offer an “alternative” perspective and greater balance. Now, we see the same rhetoric echoed not only by Serbia’s president but also in the campaigns and videos produced by the public diplomacy agency tasked with improving Serbia’s image. These narratives are being used to foster a domestic populist and authoritarian agenda that aims to consolidate power by delegitimizing values of liberal democracy and the West, validated through Russian propaganda.

This approach relies heavily on relativisation, a concept central to some of RT’s programming. The idea is to blur the lines between fact and fiction, presenting a distorted version of pluralism. What Serbia currently lacks is a true pluralism within media outlets. Instead, we have a so-called pluralism of outlets, where pro-government media dominate the national stage and propagate the same narratives, leaving little room for independent or critical voices.

RSF: How does propaganda impact Serbia’s citizens?

RN: To understand the long-term impact of propaganda, consider this: according to opinion polls, fewer Serbians support joining NATO today than just a year after the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the percentage favoring an alliance with Russia rose from 11% in 2000 to 24% in 2022. This shift demonstrates how propaganda is shaping public opinion over time, capitalizing on historical grievances and political narratives. 

Propaganda in Serbia also thrives because of a lack of trust in the media. While many citizens recognize manipulations and disinformation, the majority still rely on national TV stations — controlled by pro-government forces — as their main source of political, social, and economic news. These stations often align with government narratives, creating an ecosystem where disinformation is legitimised and amplified by state officials.

RSF: What are the main goals of this propaganda ecosystem in Serbia?

RN: Propaganda in Serbia serves multiple agendas. The first and most significant is to maintain the current government’s power by exploiting historical grievances — such as the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the Kosovo conflict, and even narratives from World War II. These grievances are weaponized to vilify Western democracies, presenting them as the root of Serbia’s problems, from unemployment to economic struggles. The primary objective isn’t necessarily to glorify Russia but to create doubt and disillusionment about the European Union and Western institutions. This alignment benefits the Serbian government, which has roots in nationalist ideologies from the 1990s. Many current leaders, including President Vučić — who was the Minister of Information during the era of Slobodan Milosevic [Serbian and Yugoslav dictator in the 1990s] — have a history of using the media to control narratives. 

Serbian citizens are the victims of a deep, ongoing propaganda campaign. It’s often difficult to distinguish between internal and external sources of this disinformation, as the narratives overlap and serve mutual interests. However, when analyzing the motives and benefits of this disinformation — much like in any crime — it becomes evident that both the Serbian government and Russian interests gain significantly.

The government uses these narratives to strengthen its domestic political base by portraying Serbia as a proud victim of Western injustices. This framing shifts blame for societal and economic issues onto external actors while fostering nationalism. Meanwhile, Russian propaganda uses these narratives to undermine trust in Western institutions, further isolating Serbia from European integration.

RSF: What role do intellectuals and academics play in this propaganda ecosystem?

RN: This is where RT’s strategy becomes particularly concerning. In addition to serving as a source for mainstream media narratives, RT provides a platform for intellectual and ideological support. It has cultivated a network of university professors, seasoned journalists, and thinkers who promote nationalism and anti-Western ideologies.

RT gathers individuals who offer intellectual validation for nationalism and the idea of a multipolar world that undermines Western dominance. Some of these figures have direct ties to the past, while others are protégés of those earlier ideologues.

RSF: Government representatives claim that President Vučić doesn’t control influential media outlets like the daily newspaper Informer or Pink TV, arguing that they are independent companies. After twelve years in power, how credible is this claim?

RN: The claim that Vučić doesn’t control major media outlets is hard to take seriously after more than a decade of direct power. These outlets consistently align with his narratives, amplify them and never contradict his statements. On EU integration, for instance, pro-government media are far from neutral. Most of them undermine the EU, which is the entity the President speaks most negatively about, in contrast to China or Russia, for example. Public opinion shows that people consuming these media are internalising these sentiments, meaning that media help the government in preparing the constituency for potentially abandoning the EU integration process. 

The media’s primary role is to keep Vučić in power by fostering a sense of external danger and positioning him as Serbia’s savior. This aligns with Russian propaganda narratives, which also exploit fear and external threats. The symbiosis between Serbian pro-government media and Russian messaging ensures that the same enemies — Western democracies — are vilified in both contexts.